1 Road Trip (20 points)

Six students are going on a foreign trip on which they will live close together. Where they are going, there is a disease which spreads easily among people who live close together. The value of the trip to a student who does not get the disease is 6. The value of the trip to a student who gets the disease is 0.

There is a vaccination against the disease. The vaccination costs different amounts for different students (perhaps they have different health plans). Let’s call the students 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 and 6 respectively. The vaccination costs 1 for student 1; it costs 2 for student 2; etc.... If a student gets vaccinated, he will not get the disease. But, if he is not vaccinated then his probability of getting the disease depends on the total number in the group who are not vaccinated. If he is the only person not to get vaccinated then the probability that he gets the disease is 1/6. If there is one other person who is not vaccinated (i.e., two in all including him) then the probability that he gets the disease is 2/6. If there are two other people who are not vaccinated (i.e., three including him) then the probability that he gets the disease is 3/6, etc.... For example, suppose only students 2 and 4 get vaccinated. Then 2’s expected payoff is 6 -(2) where the 2 is the cost of the vaccination. Student 4’s expected payoff in this case is 6 -(4). Student 5’s expected payoff in this case (recall he did not get vaccinated) is $6 \times \frac{5}{6} + 0 \times \frac{1}{6} = 2$ where the fraction $\frac{4}{6}$ is the probability that he gets the disease. To model this game, suppose that each student aims to maximize his expected payoff.

The students decide, individually and simultaneously, whether or not to get a vaccination.

(a) Explain concisely whether or not it is a Nash equilibrium for students 1, 2, 3 and 4 to get vaccinated and students 5 and 6 not to get vaccinated. (5 points)

(b) Explain concisely whether or not it is a Nash equilibrium for students 1, 2 and 3 to get vaccinated and students 4, 5, and 6 not to get vaccinated. (5 points)

(c) Which players in this game have strictly or weakly dominated strategies? Explain your answers carefully including whether any domination is strict or weak. (5 points)

(d) If we delete all strictly and weakly dominated strategies from all players, which players in the game now have (iteratively) strictly or weakly dominated strategies? Explain carefully. (5 points)

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1This is an open book exam. The exam game lasts 30 minutes.